Fix XSS via unsafe rendering of untrusted external data in templates (#5826)
Remove |safe filter from 6 template locations where data from external
search engine APIs was rendered as raw HTML without sanitization. Jinja2
autoescape now properly escapes these fields.
The |safe filter was originally added in commit 213041adc (March 2021)
by copying the pattern from result.title|safe and result.content|safe.
However, title and content are pre-escaped via escape() in webapp.py
lines 704-706 before highlight_content() adds trusted <span> tags for
search term highlighting. The metadata, info.value, link.url_label,
repository, and filename fields never go through any escaping and flow
directly from external API responses to the template.
Affected templates and their untrusted data sources:
- macros.html: result.metadata from DuckDuckGo, Reuters, Presearch,
Podcast Index, Fyyd, bpb, moviepilot, mediawiki, and others
- paper.html: result.metadata from academic search engines
- map.html: info.value and link.url_label from OpenStreetMap
user-contributed extratags
- code.html: result.repository and result.filename from GitHub API
Example exploit: a search engine API returning
metadata='<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>' would execute
arbitrary JavaScript in every user's browser viewing that result.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
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{%- if result.length and not result.thumbnail %}<div class="result_length">{{ _('Length') }}: {{ result.length }}</div>{% endif -%}
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{%- if result.views %}<div class="result_views">{{ _('Views') }}: {{ result.views }}</div>{% endif -%}
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{%- if result.author %}<div class="result_author">{{ _('Author') }}: {{ result.author }}</div>{% endif -%}
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{%- if result.metadata %}<div class="highlight">{{ result.metadata|safe }}</div>{% endif -%}
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{%- if result.metadata %}<div class="highlight">{{ result.metadata }}</div>{% endif -%}
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{%- endmacro -%}
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<!-- Draw result sub footer -->
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